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Abstract Multi-agent systems have attracted the attention of researchers because of agents’
automatic, pro-active, and dynamic problem solving behaviors. Consequently, there has been
a rapid development in agent technology which has enabled us to provide or receive useful
and convenient services in a variety of areas such as banking, transportation, e-business, and
healthcare. In many of these services, it is, however, necessary that security is guaranteed.
Unless we guarantee the security services based on agent-based systems, these services will
face significant deployment problems. In this paper, we survey existing work related to secu-
rity in multi-agent systems, especially focused on access control and trust/reputation, and
then present our analyses. We also present existing problems and discuss future research
challenges.
Keywords Intelligent agents · Multiagent system · Security · Access control · Trust ·
Reputation
1 Introduction
An agent is an autonomous and goal-oriented software entity which collaborates and com-
municates with other software entities and humans (Greenberg et al. 1998). There are various
definitions of an agent, but the most common characteristics of agents are: autonomy, social
ability, reactivity, and pro-activity (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). Because of such charac-
teristics, the agent paradigm has become a promising technology for developing applications
in open, distributed, and heterogeneous environments. Indeed, agent-based systems have
been widely developed in open distributed environments, especially in electronic commerce,
mobile computing, network management, and information retrieval areas.
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In agent-based systems, agents may try to obtain information from other agents or gain
access to remote service provider agents in order to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, in
open environments where agents are able to freely move around, such activities would be
unsafe and unreliable because it is hard to know which agents are trustworthy and which
external accesses are not harmful. Without appropriate solutions to such security problems,
some sensitive information can be leaked or a system can be easily compromised. Partic-
ularly, some critical transactions, such as those related to banking or personal healthcare
systems, must be securely performed. However, agent’s characteristics, such as autonomy,
heterogeneity, and openness, make it hard to guarantee security of these systems. Neverthe-
less, it is important to secure MASs in order to fully benefit from agent technology for a
wide range of applications. To protect agent-based systems against security threats, we need
to guarantee key security properties like confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountabil-
ity and non-repudiation through different mechanisms such as authentication, authorization,
trust management, etc.
In recent years, many researchers have attempted to address security issues in agent-based
systems. They have analyzed security vulnerabilities and identified security requirements and
challenges. In addition, possible security attacks have been studied, and applicable security
techniques for attacks have been suggested. Various security models, middleware, and secu-
rity services have also been proposed. Among a variety of security issues, the security for
mobile agent systems has been the main focus of many researchers. A mobile agent is a
particular type of agent with the ability to migrate from one host to another where it can
resume its execution (Borselius 2002). An agent’s mobility is not a mandatory characteristic
but it has recently attracted attention because of its advantages. The most significant benefit
of using mobile agents is that they can help to reduce network traffic and overcome network
latencies (Chess et al. 1996). Furthermore, if we can solve the security problems related to
mobile agents, then these solutions can be easily applied to solve the security problems of
any type of agent-based system (Ghanea-Hercock and Gifford 2001). In addition to research
focused on mobile agent security in general, some researchers have studied solutions for
specific requirements of access control and trust management. Furthermore, many existing
security solutions have been analyzed for their applicability to agent-based systems. Besides
security considerations for agent-based systems, some researchers have also proposed using
agents to provide security services; we do not discuss these in this paper.
In this paper, we present a survey of existing work on security requirements analysis
and security solutions for agent-based systems, especially focused on access control and
trust models. We also discuss their limitations and future challenges. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces research addressing the security requirements
for multi-agent systems (MASs) by analyzing related threats and vulnerabilities. In Sect. 3,
we present existing security solutions to defend against various threats. Section 4 surveys
authentication techniques and access control models suitable for MASs, including trust man-
agement solutions for the purpose of distributed access control. Section 5 presents existing
research related to trust and reputation in MASs. Finally, in Sect. 6, we conclude and present
future research directions.
2 Security requirements in MAS
In this section, we first define and characterize MASs; then we describe security vulnerabil-
ities based on agents’ characteristics and then identify security requirements for MASs.
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2.1 Multi-agent systems
There are many different definitions for agents and MASs. For our purpose, we use the fol-
lowing commonly accepted definition (Jennings et al. 1998): “An agent is a software entity,
situated in some environment, that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in order to meet
its design objectives”. Although there is no universally accepted definition, most research-
ers agree that the agent’s common characteristics of situatedness, autonomy, and flexibility
(Franklin and Graesser 1996; Jansen 2000; Jennings et al. 1998) distinguish its paradigm
from other software paradigms.
Situatedness means that an agent is aware of its specific condition based on sensory input
it receives from its environment. Autonomy means that agents are able to control their own
actions and internal states without the direct intervention of humans or other agents. Flexi-
bility is the ability to adapt to changing situations and perform actions seamlessly towards
achieving an agent’s goals. Flexibility has three properties: responsiveness, proactiveness,
and social-ability. Responsiveness means agents can perform actions that change the environ-
ment or give feedback as a response when they are aware of their environment. Proactiveness
means that agents do not simply act in response to their environment; rather, they are able to
exhibit goal-directed behavior (Franklin and Graesser 1996). Social-ability means that agents
are able to interact with other agents and humans in order to solve their own problems or
to help others. In addition, there are additional characteristics, such as mobility, rationality,
veracity, and benevolence. A mobile agent, as mentioned earlier, is an agent that also has
the characteristic of mobility, that is, the ability to migrate across networks and between
different hosts (Greenberg et al. 1998). While agent systems can significantly benefit from
such mobility of agents, the mobility of agents also introduces significant security concerns.
Several researchers have concentrated on the security problems of mobile agent systems. We
describe the problems and existing solutions in the following sections in detail.
Note that, as discussed earlier, a MAS is an agent-based system consisting of interacting
agents (Ferber 1999). Generally, MASs have some complex problems to solve that require
cooperation among agents. In addition, many MASs have no global control, and their data
is usually decentralized. In order to make a MAS secure, we should deal with problems that
occur across a system as well as problems within a single agent.
2.2 Vulnerabilities and security requirements
The agent paradigm has been shown to be a promising approach to develop intelligent,
heterogeneous, and open systems, because of its features, such as autonomy, flexibility, and
cooperative problem solving behavior. However, such characteristics make it more difficult
to assure the security of MASs. Nowadays, many applications are being developed as MASs,
even in security critical areas such as online-business, banking, and the medical service
areas. Many researchers have recognized the security vulnerabilities of MASs and identified
possible attacks.
In Borselius (2002), Mouratidis et al. (2003), authors present the security requirements
of the MASs based on agents’ characteristics. With regards to the situatedness character-
istic, the verification of origin of information is a critical issue. If environmental informa-
tion comes from an agent’s host, then the security concerns may be minimal. If agents,
however, get information from the Internet, we should check whether that information is
trustworthy or not. Basically, an agent should know the source and the trustworthiness of
information it uses. These concerns are issues related to authentication and integrity of infor-
mation. The agent’s autonomy might bring serious security problems because malicious
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agents can be propagated without any request from other agents or humans (Mouratidis
et al. 2003). Therefore, agents should be able to prevent or repair damages that are poten-
tially inflicted by unauthorized accesses; and a MAS should be protected against malicious
intrusions caused by other autonomous agents. With regards to social-ability, we should be
able to assure secure communication among agents and also between agents and humans. In
order to do so, we need to guarantee several security goals in MASs such as confidentiality,
integrity, availability, accountability and non-repudiation. In addition, the agent’s mobility
may cause serious security problems. A host can be damaged by a malicious mobile agent.
On the other hand, a malicious host may be able to compromise the security of mobile
agents. Accordingly, we need security solutions for protecting both the hosts and mobile
agents. To assure a mobile agent’s security, we need to pay attention to the interactions
with other malicious agents and users, as well as malicious hosts. Furthermore, cooper-
ation among agents may cause more serious security problems. In order to achieve their
goals, sometimes agents may need to access resources maintained and owned by others or to
know about the internal status of other agents. If cooperation is allowed without appropriate
authentication and authorization mechanisms in place, then serious security problems may
arise.
In addition to identifying specific vulnerabilities related to agents’ characteristics, other
possible attacks against MASs have been studied in the literature. In Poslad et al. (2002),
security attacks related to an abstract MAS architecture have been discussed. This work ana-
lyzes the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) architecture. The FIPA Abstract
Architecture (FIPA 2002a) defines how agents can locate and communicate with each other by
registering themselves and exchanging messages at an abstract level. To do this, a set of archi-
tectural elements and relationships among them have been defined. Among these elements,
Poslad et al. focus on the model of service discovery, the message transport interoperability,
the Agent Communication Language (ACL) representations, the content language, and the
multiple directory services representation. They describe several threats associated with the
name service, the directory service, and the communication service of the FIPA MAS archi-
tecture. The name service component may allow agents’ fake identification in a message
exchange or service request. While providing a directory service, Denial of Service (DoS) or
unauthorized modifications are possible. During communication among entities in a MAS,
key concerns are the eavesdropping or corruption of transmitted data. The authors analyze
possible attacks with regard to the FIPA Abstract Architecture but do not provide solutions
to those attacks.
Aside from the security attacks caused by architectural vulnerabilities, there has been
significant research about security attacks related to mobile agent systems. In Greenberg
et al. (1998), attacks to mobile agent systems have been classified into seven different types:
damage, DoS, breach of privacy or theft, harassment, social engineering, event-triggered
attacks and compound attacks. The event-triggered attack, called the logic bomb, is an
attack triggered by an external event such as time, location, or the arrival of a specific
person. The compound attack is composed of multiple attacks, possibly by cooperating
agents or hosts. In Wang et al. (2005), attacks associated with the agent’s mobility have
been described. The authors argue that a mobile agent is vulnerable to attacks such as mas-
querading, DoS, eavesdropping, and alteration. On the other hand, a host may be vulnera-
ble to masquerading, DoS, unauthorized access, and copy-and-reply. Moreover, the authors
describe attacks to cooperating agents such as masquerading, DoS, unauthorized access, and
repudiation.
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3 Existing security solutions for MASs
As mentioned above, recently, many security vulnerabilities have been pointed out and attacks
to MASs have been studied. To protect systems and recover from attacks, various security
techniques have been proposed in the literature. In this section, we provide a summary of
existing solutions to the security problems in MASs; these include specific security services,
as well as general models and frameworks.
3.1 Overview of security solutions
We categorize suggested solutions in terms of the security requirements of MASs driven by
the agent’s characteristics.
Regarding situatedness characteristic of agents, we should be able to identify environ-
mental information obtained from untrustworthy parties. To do so, the origin of information
must be authenticated. To recover agents from the improper accesses from other autonomous
agents, it is useful to maintain a log of interactions, or otherwise, to have a mediator agent
to interact with all other agents and manage a system’s interaction log (Jansen 2000). For
secure sharing of the individual agent’s resources and internal states during cooperation, an
agent should allow only authenticated and authorized agents to access its resources or internal
status. In order to do so, in Jennings et al. (1998), Roth (1998) proposes a method to make
each message unique by associating it with the agent’s identification and time stamp, and
uses the ownership and usage relationship between agents and their resources/internal status.
Various security solutions for protecting mobile agents and their hosts have been pro-
posed in the literature (Borselius 2002; Greenberg et al. 1998; Jansen 2000; Wang et al.
2005). To protect hosts, it is important to authenticate and authorize mobile agents. Towards
this, in Wang et al. (2005), several security techniques have been introduced, which include:
sandboxing, safe code interpretation, signed code, authorization and attribute certificates,
state appraisal, path history, proof-carrying code, and model-carrying code. The sandboxing
method is to isolate agents into a limited domain enforced by software (Borselius 2002; Jansen
2000). The safe code interpretation technique (Borselius 2002; Jansen 2000) is required when
the mobile agent’s code is interpreted. During execution of the interpreted code, it “cures” an
unsafe command or simply ignores the command. The signed code technique (Jansen 2000) is
to sign agents with the digital signatures of the creator of the agent, the agent’s owner, and/or
a trustworthy third party to make sure of the agent’s authenticity/integrity. State appraisal
(Farmer et al. 1996) aims to guarantee that an agent’s status has not been modified. The idea
of the path history technique (Roth 1998; Vigna 1997) is to make agents have a record of the
prior hosts that they have previously visited. The proof-carrying code (Necula and Lee 1998)
makes the author of an agent generate a proof that guarantees the safety of the agent code,
and then the host can verify the agent using the proof transmitted with the agent. However,
there is a drawback in that it is not easy to generate a formal proof. Unlike the proof-carrying
code, which places the burden of security entirely on the code producer, model-carrying code
(Sekar et al. 2001) distributes the burden to producers and consumers. A mobile agent host
forms a model that captures the security-relevant behavior of code, rather than a proof, by
using information accompanying the untrusted code. Code consumers are able to know the
security needs of untrusted code more precisely. In addition, the model-carrying code tech-
nique enables the consumers to try out different security policies to untrusted code before
the execution, and then select one policy.
Several techniques for protecting mobile agents have also been proposed in the litera-
ture, which include: contractual agreements, using trusted hardware or nodes, cooperating
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agents, execution tracing, sliding encryption, environmental key generation, computing with
encrypted functions, obfuscated code, and undetachable signatures (Borselius 2002). The
contractual agreement method makes host operators guarantee the security of the host by
establishing and using contractual agreements. Using trusted hardware and trusted hosts is a
simple and effective solution. Sometimes, the single-hop technique is used with the trusted
node solution in some applications. For fault-tolerant MASs, it is useful to replicate sig-
nificant information or code in cooperating agents. The execution tracing technique (Vigna
1997) keeps a record of the agent’s executions in previous host platforms. Its objective is
to detect an unauthorized modification in a mobile agent. However, the huge size of the log
becomes a drawback of this technique. In case of the exchanges of small messages, the sliding
encryption technique (Young and Yung 1997) can help to reduce the overhead to guarantee
confidentiality. The environmental key generation method (Riordan and Schneier 1998) has
been suggested as one of the security techniques to protect an agent’s privacy. Here, the
agent’s encrypted data can only be decrypted under specific predefined environmental con-
ditions. In order to ensure secure execution, the agent’s owner needs to provide an encrypted
agent function. The obfuscated code technique (Hohl 1998), referred to as blackbox security,
tries to keep the secrecy of an agent by scrambling the agent’s codes. However, this technique
has some drawbacks in that there is no universal algorithm for blackbox security and it is
effective only for a short period of time.
We categorize the aforementioned vulnerabilities, security issues, and security techniques
according to the characteristics of MASs as shown in Table 1.
3.2 Comprehensive solutions: models, middlewares, and systems
In addition to various techniques aimed at specific needs, some comprehensive solutions have
been carried out. In this section, we introduce some standards, security models, middlewares,
and secure MASs.
As an effort to standardize secure MASs, FIPA has tried to capture security concerns
into their specification. Some security requirements, including secure channels and authen-
tication, have been reflected in the FIPA Abstract Architecture specification (FIPA 2002a).
To provide specific security services to FIPA-based MASs, FIPA has specified security for
the message transport service (FIPA 2002b) and agent management (FIPA 2004). The FIPA
security technical committee has published the white paper (FIPA 2002c) of FIPA MASs
Security in 2002. They have reviewed past activities to guarantee security of FIPA-based
MASs and suggest some security issues that should be considered in such systems.
So far, there is no standard security model for MASs although various security models
have been proposed in the literature. Poslad et al. (2002) propose the asset security model. In
this model, security is defined as a set of safeguards that help protect the assets. They define
the communication service, the name service, and the directory service as the core MAS
assets, and then describe threats and safeguards for each. Mouratidis et al. (2003) propose
security concepts which enable Tropos methodology to model security concerns throughout
the entire MAS development process. Tropos (Bresciani et al. 2004a) has been proposed as an
agent-oriented software engineering methodology, but it does not consider security. Hence,
Bresciani et al. try to add security to Tropos methodology by employing various security con-
cepts, such as security constraint and security dependency; security entities such as secure
goal and secure task; and a security reference diagram. As an initial step, they introduce an
algorithm that identifies and break security bottlenecks to reduce the complexity and criti-
cality of MASs (Bresciani et al. 2004b). They have extended Tropos to propose the secure
Tropos model (Mouratidis 2007). They have also suggested a way to enhance Tropos security
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Table 1 Security vulnerabilities and techniques for MASs
Characteristics
of MASs
Vulnerability Security requirements Useful security solutions
Situatedness Origin of information Identification and
authentication of
information origin
Authentication—PKI
method, X.509 certificates,
digital signature
Autonomy Access control Authorization mechanism Access control models
Accountability through use of
interaction log of an
individual agent or system
interaction log of an
mediator agent
Social-ability Unsecure communication
among agents and between
agent and host
Communication security Authentication—PKI
method, X.509 certificates,
Digital signature
Confidentiality—encryption
methods
Mobility Malicious agents Host protection Authentication—signed code
Confidentiality—sandboxing,
safe code interpretation
Integrity—path history
Privacy—sandboxing, safe
code interpretation
Authorization—sandboxing,
safe code interpretation,
signed code, state appraisal,
path history, proof carrying
code
Malicious host Agent protection Authentication—undetachable
signatures
Confidentiality—sliding
encryption
Integrity—trusted hardware
or nodes, cooperating
agents, execution tracing,
sliding encryption,
computing with encrypted
functions, obfuscated code
Privacy—trusted hardware or
nodes, environmental key
generation, obfuscated code
Authorization—contractual
agreements
Fault tolerance—replication
of information or code in
cooperating agents
Cooperation Access to resources and
internal status of other
agents
Identification,
authentication
and authorization of
cooperating agents
Authentication—PKI
method, X.509 certificates,
digital signature
Secure sharing of resources Authorization—access
control models (DAC,
MAC, RBAC, etc)
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by integrating three secure processes (Mouratidis and Giorgini 2009). A selection process is
first added to choose a system’s architectural style such as the client/server style or the mobile
agent style by using the satisfiability calculation. After this selection, a process to transform
the requirements to a design is performed, and then a test process validates an implemented
security solution based on various attack scenarios.
Beydoun et al. (2009) propose a meta-model for MASs by adding security concerns into
FAML (Beydoun et al. 2006), the FAME Agent-oriented Modeling Language. FAML is a
general meta-model to describe features of MASs, but it does not consider security require-
ments. In that work, the authors have described some vulnerabilities caused by the MAS’s
characteristics, such as cooperation, autonomy, and mobility. To address such vulnerabilities,
they extend the original FAML by inserting security techniques such as an interaction history
log.
van’t Noordende et al. (2004) suggest a security architecture for the Mansion-based mobile
agent systems. Mansion is a multilayered middleware system designed to support large-scale
mobile agent systems. Mansion provides security using authentication and authorization
services. The signed code technique is used to authenticate mobile agents, and all objects
have an access control list (ACL) indicating the agents authorized to access them. To control
information flow, it uses confined rooms. If a mobile agent enters a confined room, then its
interaction with the outside is cut off. For mobile agent protection, Mansion provides secure
AMS (Agent Management Service), such as location look-up service and auditor and notary
processes. In addition, it maintains the audit trails, which help to protect agents from tam-
pering with an agent’s persistent state during multi-hop travel. It also provides agents the
handoff protocol to guarantee secure migration of mobile agents.
Vuong and Fu (2001) propose a secure mobile agent system, called the Secure Actigen
System (SAS). SAS provides several security services for hosts and mobile agents. For host
protection, it offers digital certificate service and digital signature service based on SHA1-
DSA algorithm in order to authenticate mobile agents. Moreover, a host must check its own
security policies before it provides services to a mobile agent. To protect an agent’s integrity,
it uses the syntactic integrity check mechanism and the append-only data log approach.
Recently, security mechanisms employed by agent platforms has been evaluated by several
researchers. Fischmeister et al. (2001) has provided a test result on three Java-based mobile
agent platforms: Aglets, Jumping Beans, and Grasshopper. They focus on the attacks that
can be launched by a mobile agent against the authorization mechanisms of these platforms.
They report several vulnerabilities on the listed agent platforms. For example, Aglets (2002)
allows unauthorized modification of security policies and the platforms to reveal a portion
of code and information about users’ identification. Jumping Beans (2006) can be disabled
or shut down by graphic user interface attacks and the runtime system call attacks. In Grass-
hopper (Bäumer and Magedanz 1999), they show that it is possible to modify the system’s
properties without any approval and to bypass its authorization system. Bürkle et al. (2009)
evaluate two different agent platforms: JADE (2007) and the Secure Mobile Agents (SeMoA
2007). They demonstrate attacks that can be launched by malicious mobile agents and use
them to test the security of the two platforms. Towards this, they have built a testing system
consisting of various hardware having different operating systems and then have successfully
launched several attacks such as DoS, masquerading, eavesdropping, spamming, unautho-
rized access to the host’s data, etc. The tests performed on JADE reveal a serious loophole in
the security mechanisms and also show weaknesses against some attacks such as recursive
cloning, non-blocking behaviors, and spamming. SeMoA has been shown to be successful in
preventing unauthorized access and attacks to other agents. However, it has been shown to
be vulnerable to DoS attacks using the endless loop execution or memory overload. As the
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attacks become numerous and more complicated, the necessity of an attack-resistant agent
platform increases significantly. Through such evaluation results, we can identify the extent
of security that has been provided in the current platforms.
4 Access control approaches
As discussed in the previous section, many security techniques and solutions have been pro-
posed to guarantee the security of MASs. Among them, we focus on two major security
solutions in this paper: access control and trust approaches. In this section, we present a
survey of existing literature on access control and trust management.
Securing access to systems in general involves two main steps: authentication that estab-
lishes the true identity of a subject, and access control or authorization that defines which
subject has what type of access privileges to which resources. We first introduce authenti-
cation mechanisms suitable for and have been frequently suggested to be used in MASs in
Sect. 4.1. Then, we present an overview of the generic access control models and the ones
that are proposed specifically for MASs in Sect. 4.2. In Sect. 4.3, we introduce research on
trust management which supports distributed access control.
4.1 Authentication
Authentication establishes the identity of one party to the other and is prerequisite for access
control mechanisms (Sandhu and Samarati 1996).
One of the main challenges to support authentication and access control in MASs is to
enforce them in a distributed manner. Researchers have proposed the use of public-key infra-
structures (PKI) for this purpose. PKI schemes are classified as trust management protocols,
which specifically deal with authentication and access control in a distributed environment.
PKIs are the mainstream trust management systems, although there exist other successful
protocols and frameworks: e.g., Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) that provides communication
privacy and distributed authentication, and Kerberos, which is a distributed authentication
mechanism. Several research efforts in the multi-agent area have adopted the ideas of PKI,
mainly the IETF X.509 standard and Simple Public Key Infrastructure/Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure (SPKI/SDSI) or have directly used them to provide protection in
MASs.
X.509 is an IETF standard for distributed authentication, which is largely employed today
in online business applications. In this protocol, a certificate authority issues a certificate
that bind a public key to the unique ID of a principal. The authenticity of a certificate can be
verified by the certificate authority, which itself relies on (implicitly trusted) root certificates.
The important components of a X.509 certificate include the names of the issuer and subject,
the subject’s public key information, and the validity period of the certificate.
SPKI/SDSI is another standard developed with the primary intention of avoiding com-
plexities of X.509; it provides distributed authorization and bases the principals on public
keys instead of identities. Public keys can be more easily assured to be globally unique in
comparison to identities. Since there is no need to verify an identity, there are no central
certificate authorities in the sense that exists for X.509. Local names can be bound to public
keys using name certificates only for issuer’s reference. Name certificates are composed of
the public key of the issuer and subject, an identifier, a describing term, and a validity period
assigned by the issuer. Local names are used only for human convenience or for grouping
multiple principals. SPKI/SDSI is, moreover, capable of managing authorizations by granting
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authorization certificates signed by the issuers. The receiver can further delegate such autho-
rizations if the issuer allows it in the original certificate. By the propagation of delegation, the
authorization can be managed in a distributed manner. The authorization certificate is com-
posed of the public keys of the issuer and the subject, a permission specification, a delegation
bit, and a validation period. Upon receiving an access request for a resource, the provider
principal can easily verify the authorization certificate (or chain of certificates).
4.2 Access control
Various types of access control requirements exist for different types of systems and appli-
cations. There exist several access control models and policy specification frameworks to
address such needs. An access control policy defines the rules according to which the access
is regulated (Samarati and De Capitani di Vimercati 2001). Traditionally, access control pol-
icies are grouped into Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) policies. In DAC, authorization is controlled at the discretion of users, who are the
controller or owner of some resources, usually based on the identity of the requester. Access
Control Matrix is the conceptual DAC model proposed by Lampson (1974). In an open envi-
ronment where entities may be strangers to each other, attributes other than the identifier can
be used as the basis for authorization; such an approach is used in attribute-based access con-
trol models. Contrary to DAC, MAC policies are based on mandated regulations determined
by the system. For instance, the Bell LaPadula model (Bell and La Padula 1976) prevents
unauthorized information flow between higher and lower security classes based on manda-
tory rules: the no read-up and no write-down rules. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has
been proposed as an alternative to DAC and MAC, where a role is defined as a job function
within the organization that describes the authority and responsibility conferred on a user
assigned to the role (Sandhu et al. 1996). Although roles in RBAC are primarily defined for
organizations, the generality of role concept makes it applicable to many systems includ-
ing MASs. In RBAC, permissions are assigned to roles and users can exercise permissions
through activation of assigned roles. Other access control models have been proposed in
recent years to support more expressive and flexible policies. Context-aware access control
models (Covington et al. 2002; Wilikens et al. 2002; Zhang and Parashar 2004) let the policy
adapt to the changing context by specifying contextual conditions. Moreover, some access
control models deal more specifically with particular context types such as time (Bertino
et al. 2001; Joshi et al. 2005), and location (Damiani et al. 2007; Chandran and Joshi 2005).
Cremonini et al. (2000) propose an infrastructure, called TuCSoN, for coordinating sup-
port in agent-based systems. In TuCSoN, interactions among agents are mediated through
tuple centers embedded in nodes. There are gateways for nodes that are structured hierarchi-
cally, and each gateway is responsible for protection of its domain. Access to tuple centers is
controlled by using traditional access control matrix model enforced by gateways. To enable
the gateway to control its domain, the authors expand access matrix dimensions with a com-
ponent indicating nodes or sub-gateways that are included in a domain through a gateway
interface; therefore, external accesses to a domain can be handled by the top gateway. In order
to make such enforcement possible, access control privileges need to be delegated from lower
gateways to the upper gateways in the hierarchy. Later, Omicini et al. (2005) have explored
the integration of RBAC into the TuCSoN infrastructure. In order to control the coordination
protocol, the authors define a prolog-like role policy definition language. The policies can
specify the authorized actions considering the current state of roles and conditions, while
determining the next state.
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Boella and van der Torre (2004) distinguish between authorization and permission in a
community policy. In their work, a community is a distributed MAS operating in a P2P envi-
ronment. An authorization is enforced by the community authorization service based on the
community’s policy, while the actual permission is granted by the members.
From the perspective of employing access control policy models in the area of MASs, with
the exception of the above-mentioned work, most of the proposed frameworks apply very
basic policies like identity-based ACLs by implementing access matrix models. For instance,
Such et al. (2009) propose using Linux’s native access control model, which employs users,
groups, and access control lists in a MAS platform where a Linux process is regarded as an
agent. Wen and Mizoguchi (2000) base their authorization policy on roles but they do not
consider adopting the notions from RBAC models; for example, how roles are assigned to
users or how permissions are assigned to roles is not discussed.
Key challenges exist for access control in MASs that need to be further investigated.
Agents in a MAS collaborate to achieve the proposed goals of the system. It is important to
ensure that any collaboration among agents does not undermine those goals, which can be
considered as a security threat. In order to maintain this requirement, collaborations among
agents need to be controlled and secured. This aspect is not covered by the common practices
of access control models that consider protection of only information objects. It is important
that to develop proper access control models that also capture the authorized/unauthorized
interactions among agents. Jung et al. (2008) have proposed preliminary work that captures
authorization of interactions among roles in an extension to RBAC model for MASs.
Another research direction is to investigate distributed autonomous enforcement of access
control policies in practical MASs. Most of the work in MAS access control is related to the
requirement of distributed authorization (Wen and Mizoguchi 2000; Wangham et al. 2004; Hu
and Tang 2003). However, the multi-domain nature of such systems is neglected. In a MAS,
authorizations for resources that are controlled by agents, or even the agents themselves as
community resources, are typically enforced by the agents. But since agents are autonomous
entities, they may simply choose not to follow the community policy. Therefore, inconsis-
tencies may occur between policy and actual enforcement. We believe that access control
policies in MASs should be augmented with concepts related to agents, such as obligations
and responsibilities of agents.
4.3 Trust management: distributed access control
MASs consist of multiple autonomous agents with limited knowledge of each other. To enable
protection and secure operation or interaction in such systems, trust relationships must be
established between them. Trust management has been previously investigated for building
trust and controlling accesses in distributed systems. Therefore, it naturally attracts many
researchers in MAS area as a proper approach for distributed authentication and authoriza-
tion.
As distinguished from human PKI, which is used for authenticating human users, Hu and
Tang (2003) propose an agent PKI that can set up a trust path between service providers
and receiver agents and do certificate binding between humans and agents. The agent cer-
tificate authorities (CAs) are structured as trees consisting of root, general, and local CAs.
They describe a protocol for agent identity certificate application, issuance, revocation, and
verification. Attribute certificates are also issued for humans but can be used by their cor-
responding agents. The binding of a human to an agent is done by the human signing the
public key of the agent in its identity certificate. The format of attribute certificates in this
framework is similar to SPKI/SDSI.
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Wen and Mizoguchi (2000) propose an authorization-based trust model (ABTM) which
is based on SPKI/SDSI certificates, but the authorization is performed through authoriza-
tion servers, making it a semi-decentralized scheme. Resource provider agents delegate the
permission for authorization of their resources to the authorization server. Thus, the autho-
rization server can employ coherent security policies to authorize the requests; here, they
provide a role-based policy. For requesting a service, a user delegates its role to an execu-
tive agent. The agent would place a request with the authorization server providing its role
certificate. Based on the policy, the authorization server grants the authorization certificate
to the executive agent, which can be presented to the resource provider agent to access the
resource. That way, they separate the authorization decision-making, which is performed by
authorization servers, and enforcement, which is performed by resource providers.
Several researchers propose frameworks for specific applications. For instance, Wangham
et al. (2004) propose a mobile agent security scheme based on SPKI/SDSI, specific to the
application of searching and selecting partners in the formation of Virtual Enterprises and
negotiating between partners. Few have basically redefined the challenges and solutions in
SPKI/SDSI (Poggi et al. 2004), or proposed certificate-based schemes such as Novák et al.
(2003).
Formal logic-based models for distributed security provide theoretical approaches to cap-
ture the state of the entities of the systems and possible inferences in a distributed system
(Lampson et al. 1992; Abadi et al. 1992). Accordingly, some researchers have proposed new
logic or built on existing logic and the trust semantics in agent systems. Liau (2003) propose
logic that models and relates belief, information exchange, and trust in MASs. The author
provides doxastic logic with modalities for representing trusting attitudes and information
transmission actions between agents. The logic supports belief, trust, and information acqui-
sition operators to model an agent’s belief, trust in another agent about something, and how
it acquires information from another agent. Different properties of trust and information
acquisition are discussed and shown to be useful in formulating the properties of MASs.
Such logic can be used to verify the semantics of an agent system by linking system states
with agent mental states. Berkovits et al. (1998) propose trust relations in mobile agent envi-
ronments based on Lampson et al.’s logic for authentication (Lampson et al. 1992). They
focus on three goals: certification of executing a mobile agent by a host, providing necessary
privileges for agents to carry out their tasks, and ensuring the non-malicious state of an agent
due to alterations imposed by the host.
5 Trust and reputation
In addition to access control, trust and reputation are also key issues to provide secure
and trustworthy services for modern systems, especially e-business and other web systems
(Sabater and Sierra 2005). So far, a number of models and systems for trust and reputation
have been proposed in the literature. In this section, we present an analysis surveying pre-
vious work on trust and reputation in MASs. In Sect. 5.1, we first introduce the concept of
trust and reputation, and then summarize existing models and systems in Sect. 5.2. Finally,
in Sect. 5.3, we present comparisons of existing work and discuss the results.
5.1 Definition
Trust and reputation systems have been recognized as key factors for successful adoption of
electronic commerce (Resnick et al. 2000). These systems have been frequently employed
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by intelligent systems including MASs as a mechanism to search for trustworthy interaction
partners and decide whether or not to honor contracts. Before exploring existing work on
trust and reputation, we first define trust in the context of this paper. Trust is defined in a
variety of ways. Grandison and Sloman (2000) examine the various definitions of trust and
then provide a working definition of trust for internet applications: “Trust is the firm belief
in the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely, and reliably within a specified
context”. However, we adopt the definition of Mui et al. (2002), because their definition can
be considered as ‘reputation-based’ trust, and we consider trust in MASs as a concept which
strongly relates to reputation: “Trust is a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s
future behavior based on the history of their encounters”.
Reputation is a subject’s opinion or view on objects. Reputation of an agent in MASs
is an assessment of the agent, based on the history of interactions with it or observations
of it by another agent. Such reputation values can be directly evaluated by the agent itself
or reported by others. In MASs, reputation has been mostly used to establish trust between
agents (Ramchurn et al. 2004). The record of past interactions and an evaluation of an agent’s
performance are a basis for building the reputation of the agent, and such information is used
to expect the agent’s future behaviors.
Trust and reputation have played a role in facilitating interaction among agents. It is hard
for agents to decide whether other agents are malicious or not. In this circumstance, it is
really useful to know an agent’s reputation in order to find a safe partner for interaction.
Accordingly, trust mechanisms have taken an important role to ensure trusted interactions in
MASs.
Several survey papers have been published related to trust and reputation in MASs.
Ramchurn et al. (2004) broadly discuss the trust issues in open MASs. By analyzing the
characteristics of MASs, authors point out some trust issues. Sabater and Sierra (2005)
review various computational trust and reputation models using seven comparison factors;
the general model, the information source, visibility, the model’s granularity, agent behav-
ioral assumptions, and the behavior model. Arts and Gil (2007) discuss existing work on
trust in the semantic web. They categorize trust into four groups by how trust is established:
policy-based trust, reputation-based trust, general model of trust, and trust in information
resources. However, these surveys do not focus on MASs, so they fail to provide compre-
hensive analysis on the practical use of trust/reputation models and systems in MASs.
5.2 Models and systems
In this section, we introduce some existing work on trust and reputation models and systems
that are utilized in MASs.
Zacharia and Maes (2000) propose two reputation models, SPORAS and HISOTS. These
models are extensions of online reputation models, such as those used in eBay and Amazon
auctions, in that they investigate a new rating aggregation method. SPORAS is a reputation
mechanism for loosely-connected communities that share the same interest. It is a centralized
model with more sophisticated characteristics than other online reputation models that simply
decide the reputation values by collecting user’s opinions. In this model, the rating values are
aggregated by considering only the two most recent users (agents). For predicting a user’s
reputation, SPORAS provides a way to measure its reliability based on the standard deviation
of reputation values. On the other hand, HISTOS is a more personalized reputation system
than SPORAS, so it is used as a reputation mechanism for highly connected communities.
Unlike SPORAS, it calculates the reputation of a user by considering who makes the query
and how he/she has rated other users in the online community.
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While SPORAS and HISTOS are centralized models, ReGreT is a decentralized trust and
reputation system oriented towards complex and midsize e-commerce environments where
social relations among individuals play an important role (Sabater and Sierra 2001, 2002).
It evaluates trust by considering social relations and ontological considerations as well as
an agent’s direct perception of the reliability of the target agent. The ReGreT reputation
model includes three specialized reputation types which are differentiated by the informa-
tion source: witness reputation, neighborhood reputation, and system reputation. Each agent
rates its partner’s performance after every interaction and records the ratings in a local data-
base. An agent can use the stored ratings information to evaluate another agent’s trust by
querying its local database. An agent derives such a trust value by calculating the weighted
mean of all ratings, called direct trust. In this model, each rating is weighed according to its
recent activities. Like SPORAS, ReGreT also provides a measurement of reliability for each
trust value to show its predictive power. Unlike previous models, FIRE integrates a number
of information sources in open systems to produce a comprehensive assessment of an agent’s
performance (Huynh et al. 2004, 2006a,b). It categorizes information sources into four types:
interaction trust, role-based reputation, witness reputation, and certified reputation. Then, it
integrates them to calculate a more precise value of trust and reputation. First, the interaction
trust is built from direct interaction experience between two agents. Second, the role-based
reputation is modeled by the role-based relationships between two agents. To assign the role-
based trust values, some rules need to be defined. Third, the witness reputation of target agent
is built based on the observation of other agents about the target agent’s behavior. To find
some witnesses, FIRE adopts the referral system presented in Huynh et al. (2006b). Finally,
the certified reputation of target agent consists of a number of certified references about the
target’s behavior on particular tasks provided by third-party agents (Huynh et al. 2006a).
The certified reputation is defined to overcome the shortcomings of the interaction trust and
the witness reputation.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (Abdul-Rahman 2005; Abdul-Rahman and Hailes 2000) pro-
pose an Ntropi model in which trust and experience are differentiated by levels. For instance,
levels for the trust can be ‘Very Trustworthy’, ‘Trustworthy’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Untrustworthy’,
and ‘Very Untrustworthy’. This model uses not only direct trust and reputation, but also the
recommending party’s trust to assess witness credibility in computing a final trust degree for
a target. Ntropi models two types of trust: situational trust and basic trust. This model repre-
sents trust by classifying it into five levels, or strata. Its disadvantage is that the trust values
are too coarse-grained, thereby, losing both sensitivity and accuracy. Although comparisons
are easier, the update of values is more complex than using continuous values.
Multi-Dimensional Trust (MDT) is proposed for multi-dimensional trust (Griffiths 2005).
Agents model the trustworthiness of others according to various criteria, such as cost, time-
liness, or success, depending on which criteria the agent considers important. In this model,
agents use their own direct experience of interactions with others. To improve the model,
MDT-R has been proposed with the concept of recommendation (Lim Choi Keung and
Griffiths 2008). MDT-R stratifies trust into several levels for ease of comparison. In this
model, the summaries of relevant past interactions are shared instead of the explicit values
for trust, since sharing of information among agents often suffers from the differences in
subjective interpretation of each agent. A recent work extends the MDT-R’s mechanism to
obtain recommendations by including indirect recommendations also.
This mainstream approach of using social networks in trust and reputation models is
attracting many researchers. Yu and Singh tackle the problem of retrieving ratings from a
social network through the use of referrals, pointing to other sources of information similar
to web links (Yu and Singh 2002, 2003). They propose a method of representing a social
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network and gathering information through the network. They show how agents can explore
a network and use referrals gathered to build up a model of a social network. Schillo et al.
(2000) propose to enhance the representation of existing social networks by annotating the
particular characteristics of network nodes. Each node holds two values, trust value and the
degree of altruism. In this model, the trust values describe the degree of an agent(node)’s
honesty. Both values are used to deduce the trustworthiness of witnesses queried at the time
of calculating the reputation of potential interaction partners. Pujol et al. (2002) propose the
Node Ranking algorithm for creating a ranking of an agent’s reputation in a community by
means of a corresponding social network. The main idea is that each node has authority and
a part of this authority is propagated to the out-nodes via out-edges. ReGreT, as mentioned
above, also exploits social network technologies (Sabater and Sierra 2001). By using the
social dimension in its reputation system, agents start to take into account social relations
and such social information becomes important to build a good reputation as well as to know
other agents’ reputation.
Agents can change their behavior unpredictably, hence the trust and reputation models
need to be aware of such changes and be able to adjust corresponding values dynamically.
This is a reason why establishing a dynamic models of trust and reputation is one of the most
challenging requirements today. Some recent research has proposed approaches to address
such requirements. For example, Li et al. (2008) propose a dynamic trust model for MASs.
This integrated trust model, similar to ReGreT and FIRE, is used to calculate the trust and
reputation values of agents, such as recent trust, historical trust, expected trust, and confi-
dence factor. As a major contribution, this model introduces a filtering method that removes
inaccurate values.
5.3 Comparison and discussion
In this section, we compare existing models described above. We first investigate several
comparison factors that can differentiate MASs from other systems and then compare and
categorize existing work.
5.3.1 Comparison factors
Information sources. Information sources can be considered as a main factor in comparing
trust and reputation models/systems. Each of them gathers information from the environ-
ment or agents and then calculates the trust and reputation values. Usually, three kinds of
information are used to do this, which are: direct experiences, witness information, and the
relationship among agents.
Obviously, direct experience is the most relevant and reliable information source, so tradi-
tional systems mainly depend on this information. Witness information is knowledge gathered
from other agents in the same society. If you want to use witness information, you need to
verify it first, because it is relatively less reliable than the direct experience.
The information about relationships among agents indicates a social relationship (Sabater
and Sierra 2005) or a role-based relationship (Huynh et al. 2006a). When two agents interact
with each other, the trust and reputation value can be more reliable by considering their
relationship.
Reliability measurement of trust and reputation. This factor shows whether a model pro-
vides a method to measure the reliability of trust and reputation values. For example, let’s
assume the following situation: agent a1 usually trusts agent a2, but sometimes, the trust value
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is not reliable if a1 does not have sufficient experience. To evaluate the reliability of trust or
reputation, some models employ the certified agents or define a formula for calculating its
reliability.
Distributed reputation. MASs are essentially distributed systems, therefore, their reputa-
tion systems should be able to support a distributed mechanism to generate and maintain the
trust and reputation values. From this perspective, it is important to classify models by their
ability in distributed reputation. Most recent models are the distributed models, but some of
them are not fully distributed. Besides, the centralized reputation methods are still used in
online e-commerce systems.
Agent behavior assumption. Some existing models assume that agent’s behavior is used to
build trust and reputation. To classify the level of assumptions regarding agent behavior, we
adopt the three levels introduced in Sabater and Sierra (2005):
• Level 0—A model relies on a large number of agents who offer honest ratings to counter-
act the potential effect of the ratings provided by malicious agents. It does not consider
an agent’s malicious behavior on rating.
• Level 1—A model assumes that agents can hide specific information or provide biased
information but they never lie. It means that agents are honest in exchanging information.
• Level 2—A model has specific mechanisms to deal with liars.
Filtering inaccurate trust. Agents do not act in a static way, but they perform their actions
depending on their belief or social commitment. However, sometimes their belief can be
wrong even though they are not liars; that is, they might have inaccurate information and the
corresponding trust value can, consequently, be inaccurate. Therefore, the trust and reputation
systems need to catch such inaccurate values and then fix them to assure trusted interactions.
Composition. Wang and Singh (2006a,b, 2007) introduce the combination of trust and rep-
utation. It is clear that trust cannot be trivially propagated, but in some cases, it is better to
compose different trust values. For example, a1 may trust a2 who trusts a3, but a1 may not
trust a3. In this case, to calculate a1’s trust of a3, a1’s and a2’s trust of each other must be
considered.
5.3.2 Discussion
In Table 2, we list various approaches described in this paper and compare them on the basis
of six factors. With regards to distributed reputation, most existing work supports this factor.
With regards to reliability, ReGreT and FIRE build the trust and reputation values from a
variety of information sources by integrating each value from a source, and hence, the trust
values become more reliable. However, they have to cover the high cost and overhead to
maintain all information sources and relationships among agents. Furthermore, there is a
scalability issue with regards to maintaining witnesses.
Some recent work has proposed methods to evaluate and measure the reliability of trust
values. The certified reputation model in FIRE evaluates the combined trust values, and then
certifies the value or fixes it by increasing or decreasing it. The confidence factor introduced
in Li’s work plays a similar role in the certified model of FIRE, but it requires a centralized
server or some trustworthy agents to do such measurements. Due to this limitation, it is hard
to use this model in dynamic MASs.
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Table 2 Comparison between various trust and reputation models/systems
IS RM DR BA FI TC
SPORAS WI  × Level 0 × ×
HISTOS DE + WI × × Level 0 × ×
REGRET DE + WI + RI   Level 2  ×
FIRE DE + WI + RI   Level 1 × ×
Ntropi DE   Level 0 × ×
MDT DE, WI   Level 0 × ×
Li et al. DE   Level 2  ×
Wang and Singh DE + RI ×  Level 2  
Schillo et al. DE, WI ×  Level 1 × ×
Pujol et al. N/A × × Level 2 × ×
Yu and Singh DE, WI ×  Level 1 × 
IS information sources, DE direct experience, WI witness information, RI relationship information, RM reli-
ability measure, DR distributed reputation, BA agent behavior assumptions, FI filtering inaccurate value, TC
trust composition
Since agents are autonomous entities and there is no central authority, agents’ opinions and
behaviors cannot be anticipated. In this sense, the assumptions for agent behaviors described
above might not be practical. ReGreT, and Lie et al.’s and Want and Singh’s methods employ
level-2 assumptions, but none provide a complete solution. In fact, this problem is a highly
complicated one requiring artificial intelligence techniques to overcome it.
6 Security challenges and conclusion
In this section, we summarize the key security challenges on MASs. Then we conclude this
paper.
6.1 Security challenges
Although existing research provides useful solutions to guarantee the security in MASs,
unsolved problems still remain. Furthermore, new challenges arise as new technologies are
developed. In this section, we discuss the future challenges on which we should focus.
6.1.1 Authorized collaboration
Collaboration is one effective means to achieve agents’ goals in MASs. However, collabora-
tion with malicious agents may make agents deviate from achieving their goals. For instance,
a malicious agent may ask other agents to provide services that it really doesn’t need with
the intent to make some community resources unavailable. To overcome such undesirable
interactions, a solution to the problem of how to control authorized collaborations is required.
A proper access control model is needed to enable secure cooperation among agents.
6.1.2 Autonomous access control enforcement
In scalable MASs, access control must be enforced in a distributed manner. An agent, either
as a controller of environmental objects or as an interaction partner of other agents, can
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be an actual enforcer of authorization policy in such systems. However, agents are auton-
omous entities so they may simply choose not to follow authorization policies previously
agreed to. To cope with such enforcement problems, some concepts such as commitment and
responsibilities of agents beyond authorization are required.
6.1.3 Trust composition
Wang and Singh (2007) have introduced a method called trust composition, which combines
several trust values from different agents. Let’s look at an example. Agent a1 trusts agent
a2, and a2 trusts agent a3. We cannot say that a1 trusts a3, because trust relationship is not
necessarily transitive. Most existing approaches do not contribute to this issue but a few
researchers have tried various techniques to combine trust values. Unfortunately, there is
lack of practical or comprehensive solutions.
However, the importance of trust composition is obvious when considering the organiza-
tion of agent groups. In a group, agents generally interact with each other to achieve their
common goals. To recruit the best agents for a group, each agent should be a trustworthy
partner with others in the group. However, this is definitely a complicated problem since it
is hard for an agent to get complete knowledge about other agents. In such circumstances,
the trust composition can play a critical role for determining the trust and reputation values
for unknown agents.
6.1.4 Filtering inaccurate trust
Sometimes, agents’ trust value might be inaccurate; hence, the trust and reputation systems
should be able to filter out the inaccurate reports to maintain its trustworthiness. Li et al.
(2008) have addressed this issue by using past interactions and witness information, but
the method to find inaccurate reports and to recalculate the value is still naive and not very
practical. If we eliminate the inaccuracy of trust and reputation values, then we can guarantee
more reliable interactions in MASs.
6.1.5 Trust and reputation customization (personalization)
It is not easy to select the most suitable trust/reputation model for each application and
adapt it for the particular requirements of the application, since trust and reputation are very
subjective. Consequently, it is difficult for users cannot to easily adapt a model to match their
needs without resorting to re-programming it. A work called PTF (Personalized Trust Frame-
work) proposed by Huynh (2009) can be considered as a first work towards this direction.
6.2 Conclusion
Agent technology can benefit many application systems with advanced characteristics such as
autonomy, intelligence, and dynamic and cooperative problem solving abilities. Many MASs
have been developed for different application areas. However, ensuring security of such agent
based environments is very critical. To address security requirements, many researchers have
proposed various types of security approaches for MASs. In this paper, we have reviewed and
categorized the existing related work on security issues. Among the many security issues,
we have focused in more detail on access control and trust/reputation issues. Despite many
efforts, several problems still remain and new challenges are continuously being identified
as new technologies are developed.
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